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This paper examines the effect of inequality on the incentives to emigrate according to a
person’s education and unobservable skills (residual wage). Borjas (1987) shows that higher
skilled individuals are more likely to emigrate than lower skilled individuals when the returns
to skill are higher in a potential foreign destination. Using a unique data set on Israeli
emigrants, we show that the probability of emigrating indeed increases monotonically with
education. However, the relationship between residual wages and emigration rates exhibits
an inverse u-shaped pattern. We build a model to explain both of these patterns by
incorporating the idea that education is a “general” skill which can be transferred to a
foreign country, but residual wages are composed of “general” and “country-specific skills”
which are not easily transferable. We test the model’s predictions by exploiting variation in
the patterns of emigration across industries and occupations. Our findings are consistent
with the theory, and therefore, highlight the importance of differentiating between general
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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀect of inequality on the incentives to emigrate accord-
ing to a person’s education and unobservable skills (residual wage). Borjas (1987)
shows that higher skilled individuals are more likely to emigrate than lower skilled
individuals when the returns to skill are higher in a potential foreign destination.
Using a unique data set on Israeli emigrants, we show that the probability of emi-
grating indeed increases monotonically with education. However, the relationship
between residual wages and emigration rates exhibits an inverse u-shaped pattern.
We build a model to explain both of these patterns by incorporating the idea that
education is a “general” skill which can be transferred to a foreign country, but
residual wages are composed of “general” and “country-speciﬁc skills” which are not
easily transferable. We test the model’s predictions by exploiting variation in the
patterns of emigration across industries and occupations. Our ﬁndings are consistent
with the theory, and therefore, highlight the importance of diﬀerentiating between
general and “country-speciﬁc” skills in order to understand emigrant selection.
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01 Introduction
This paper uses unique data from Israel to examine the eﬀect of inequality on the incentives
to emigrate according to a person’s education and unobservable skills (residual wages). In
cross-country comparisons, Israel ranks among the countries with the highest levels of
income inequality in the developed world.1 In addition, recent evidence indicates that
Israel is suﬀering from a “Brain Drain” (Gould and Moav (2007) and Ben-David (2008)).
However, this paper examines the general idea that the existence of a brain drain is a sign
that inequality is too low, a prospect which is well-founded in economic theory.
A seminal paper by Borjas (1987) shows that higher skilled workers are more likely
than less-skilled workers to leave a country with a low return to skill and move to a country
with a higher return to skill.2 The reverse is also true — a lower skilled individual is more
likely than a higher skilled worker to leave a country with a high return to skill and move to
a country with a lower return to skill. These predictions are quite intuitive — higher skilled
individuals beneﬁt from higher inequality since they are at the top of the distribution,
while lower skilled individuals beneﬁt from lower inequality since they are at the bottom
of the distribution. Therefore, a more compressed wage distribution encourages higher
skilled individuals to leave (“positive selection”), while a more dispersed wage distribution
entices lower skilled individuals to leave (“negative selection”). Thus, attempts to lower
inequality may exacerbate the magnitude of a brain drain.
In this paper, we empirically and theoretically examine the selection of emigrants in
terms of their education levels and their unobserved skills, represented by an individual’s
residual wage (after controlling for education, age, etc.). Our theoretical contribution is to
extend the Borjas model by arguing that some skills are “general” in the sense that they can
be easily transported to a foreign country, and some skills are “country-speciﬁc” in nature,
and therefore, are not easily transferred to another country. Education is an example of a
“general skill” which is likely to be rewarded in any country, while examples of “country-
speciﬁc” skills include personal connections, local knowledge of the product and labor
markets, language-speciﬁc communication skills, legal knowledge of the local environment,
licenses which are country-speciﬁc, rents from union membership, ﬁrm-speciﬁcs k i l l s ,a n d
certain instances of luck (being at the right place at the right time).
1For example, Brandolini and Smeeding (2008) examine 24 developed countries and ﬁnd that only the
United States has a higher ratio of personal disposable income between the 90th and 10th percentiles.
2Borjas (1987) builds on the classic model of occupational choice by Roy (1951). Sjaastad (1962) also
models the decision to emigrate based on the wage gain net of migration costs.
1After distinguishing between general and country-speciﬁc skills, our model shows
that a higher return in a foreign country to a general skill like education will produce
“positive selection” in terms of the education levels of those that choose to emigrate.
This prediction is similar to Borjas (1987, 1991, 1999). However, when we examine the
selection of emigrants in terms of their residual wages, we show that the relationship
between emigration and a person’s residual wage is not as straightforward — since the
residual wage is a mixture of general and country-speciﬁc skills which are unobservable to
the econometrician. As a result, our model shows that the relationship between emigrating
and residual wages is an inverse u-shape.
The intuition is straightforward — a higher return to unobservable general skills in
a foreign country implies that the beneﬁts of emigration increase with a person’s level of
unobservable general skill, but a higher level of unobserved country-speciﬁc skill raises the
costs of emigration, since these skills will be rendered obsolete. Therefore, a larger amount
of unobserved general skill relative to country-speciﬁc skill raises the probability that a
person emigrates. Furthermore, a larger proportion of individuals have a high relative
level of general to country-speciﬁc skills in the middle of the residual wage distribution
than in the tails. This is due to the fact that those at the bottom of the residual wage
distribution have very little of both types of skills, while those at the top have high levels
of both. In contrast, individuals located in the middle of the distribution may have a high
level of general or country-speciﬁc skills, but are unlikely to have high levels of both. As
a result, individuals that have a high level of unobservable general skills versus country-
speciﬁc skills are mostly in the middle of the residual wage distribution rather than in the
tails. Therefore, the model predicts that emigration rates increase with residual wages and
then decrease.
Our model also shows that an increase in the return to education or the unobservable
general skill in the foreign country will shift either curve in a way that makes the selection
of emigrants more positive. This ﬁnding highlights the idea that simply looking at the
relationship between skill and emigration, which is done in most of the current literature,
may not be a good test of the Borjas model, since many factors may inﬂuence the shape of
the overall curve. The main forces of the Borjas model may still be relevant if an increase
in the relative return to skill abroad shifts the curve so that emigrants are more positively
selected, while keeping the overall shape of the curve intact. Ignoring this idea may be
one reason why the existing evidence is very mixed regarding the predictions of the Borjas
model.
2Our empirical analysis exploits a unique data set which includes the demographic
and labor force characteristics of a random sample of Israelis in 1995, combined with an
indicator for whether the respondent decided to emigrate as of 2004. This data set is a
rare opportunity to examine the selection of emigrants using information on the emigrants
before they move.3 Without information on wages before a person decides to move, it is
impossible to examine the selection of emigrants in terms of their residual wages (unob-
servable skill).
The basic patterns in the data support the main predictions of our model. Speciﬁ-
cally, the probability of emigrating increases with education, which is consistent with the
model since the return to education in Israel is found to be much lower (0.071 versus
0.100) than the primary destination of Israeli emigrants, the United States. Also, the
overall relationship between residual wages and emigrating displays the inverse u-shaped
pattern which is predicted by our model. However, we also test the model further by
seeing whether the patterns of selection vary systematically with variation across diﬀerent
sectors (industries and occupations) in the diﬀerences between Israel and the United States
in the returns to observable (education) and unobservable skills. It is important to note
that we do not assume that all Israeli emigrants move to the US (although we show that
most of them do), nor do we assume that they do not change their industry or occupation.
Rather, the empirical strategy is to estimate to what extent Israelis consider these factors,
and whether they do so in a way that is consistent with the model.
Our ﬁndings strongly suggest that this is indeed the case: a lower return to un-
observable skill (proxied by the sector’s residual wage variance) in Israel versus the US
entices Israelis with higher residual wages to leave the country. Also, we ﬁnd that emi-
grants are more positively selected in terms of their education in industries with a lower
relative return to education in Israel versus the US. The coeﬃcient estimates are not only
statistically signiﬁcant, but also large in magnitude. For example, the estimates imply that
the positive relationship between emigration and education would be completely ﬂattened
if the returns to education in each industry were equal in Israel and the United States.
Overall, the results strongly support the predictions of the model and highlight the
3Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) write on page 240: “Largely missing in the discussion of U.S. immigration
is evidence from source countries. Surprisingly, there is little work on how the skills of immigrants compare
to the skills of nonmigrating individuals in countries of origin. Such data are essential to evaluate the
nature of migrant selection.” Akee (2009) also utilizes labor market information on emigrants before they
leave from Micronesia. Consistent with our results, he ﬁnds no linear eﬀect of household income on the
probability of emigrating, but does not examine whether the relationship is non-linear. Information on
wages of movers before they move is more common in the internal migration literature ((Borjas, Bronars,
and Trejo (1992), Dahl (2002), and Abramitzky (2007, 2008)).
3importance of diﬀerentiating between general and “country-speciﬁc” skills in order to un-
derstand emigrant selection. Moreover, our ﬁndings imply that policies aimed at reducing
inequality should focus on reducing the returns to country-speciﬁcs k i l l si no r d e rt om i n -
imize the eﬀect on the brain drain. In particular, reducing the impact of rents on wages
would have a smaller impact on the brain drain in comparison to reducing the returns
to merit, perhaps by increasing income taxes. One example could be lowering the re-
turns to tenure in collective wage bargaining agreements rather than reducing rewards for
performance.
Also, this paper presents perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of Borjas (1987)
regarding selection on education, and we are also the ﬁr s tt os h o wt h a tt h ef o r c e so f
the Borjas model hold for selection on residual wages, since an increase in the return to
unobservable skill abroad keeps the u-shaped pattern intact while shifting it to make the
selection more positive.
While no other paper has tested whether variation in the returns to unobservable
skill can explain the selection of emigrants in terms of their residual wages, there have been
several attempts to examine the Borjas model in terms of selection on education. Most of
this literature examines the selection of Mexican immigrants to the US, which according to
the basic model, should be negatively selected on education since the return to education
is higher in Mexico than the United States. The most prominent paper in this literature is
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), who ﬁnd evidence against the “negative selection” hypothesis
for Mexican immigrants to the United States.4 Instead, they ﬁnd that Mexican immigrants
to the US come from the middle of the education distribution, which they explain by
adding migration costs which decline with education to the model.5 As a result, Mexican
workers at the bottom of the distribution are less likely to move due to their higher costs of
moving, while those at the top of the distribution are less likely to move due to the higher
returns to education in Mexico. In contrast, our results regarding selection on education
are consistent with the basic model with or without the assumption that migration costs
4Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) ﬁnd similar results for illegal immigrants from Mexico. However, Ibar-
raran and Lubotsky (2005) argue that Mexican immigrants are negatively selected, and consistent with
Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987), the degree of negative selection increases from Mexican counties with a
higher return to skill. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) show that the selection of Mexican immigrants be-
comes more negative from areas in Mexico which have lower overall migration costs (i.e. stronger migration
networks).
5They argue that migration costs decline with education due to the eﬀect of education on the ability
to overcome bureaucratic requirements, the lower time costs required to earn enough money to pay the
ﬁxed-costs of moving, and fewer credit constraints on educated individuals. Chiswick (1999) also argues
that moving costs decline with education, which tends to produce positive selection in emigrants.
4decline with education, and this additional assumption cannot help to explain the inverse
u-shaped pattern we see regarding selection on unobservable skill (residual wages). If we
add moving costs which decline with unobservable skill, this will only make those at the
top of the residual wage distribution even more likely to emigrate, when in fact, our goal
is to explain why those at the top have lower emigration rates than those in the middle of
the distribution. Therefore, the augmented model by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) is useful
in understanding Mexican immigration, but cannot explain the inverse u-shaped pattern
we observe in our data, thus underscoring the theoretical contribution of distinguishing
between “general” and “country-speciﬁc” skills in our model.
The literature on the selection of emigrants from countries other than Mexico presents
a mixed picture in terms of being consistent with Borjas (1987).6 This is largely due to the
general pattern whereby highly educated individuals leave less developed countries with
high returns to education and move to developed countries with lower returns to education.
This pattern is not consistent with the predictions of the basic model in Borjas (1987).
There may be many confounding factors in this type of empirical analysis, since there is
large variation across countries in many factors which may inﬂuence the size and direction
of the selection — such as language barriers, proximity, moving costs, immigration policy,
visa requirements, etc. This may be one reason why the evidence in favor of the Borjas
(1987) model is stronger in studies looking at internal migration (Borjas, Bronars, and
Trejo (1992), Dahl (2002), and Abramitzky (2007, 2008)).
Our study is not aﬀected by cross-country diﬀerences in factors which inﬂuence the
selection of emigrants, since we exploit variation in the patterns of selection across sectors
within one country, rather than across countries. Moreover, we examine emigrant selection
based on education and unobservable skill (residual wages), and not just on education
which is the focus of the studies mentioned above.
6This literature includes Borjas (1987), who uses data on U.S. immigrants from 41 countries in the
1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses and ﬁnds weak evidence that the source country’s income inequality is
negatively related to immigrant wages. Cobb-Clark (1993) ﬁnds similar results for female immigrants.
Feliciano (2005) examines 32 immigrant groups in the United States, and ﬁnds that all but one group
(immigrants from Puerto Rico) are positively selected in terms of education. However, Feliciano (2005)
ﬁnds an insigniﬁcant relationship between inequality and the degree of positive selection from the source
country. Grogger and Hanson (2008) examine the sorting of immigrants to 15 OECD countries from 102
source countries and ﬁnd that immigrants in host countries are positively selected in relation to the source
country when the education gap in wages between the host and source countries increases. However, when
the education wage gap is measured in logs, they ﬁnd evidence in favor of negative selection when the
return to education is higher in the source country. Belot and Hatton (2008) examine immigrants in 29
OECD countries from 80 source countries and ﬁnd little evidence in favor of the main prediction in Borjas
(1987). Only after considering the poverty constraints in poor countries do they ﬁnd evidence in support
of Borjas (1987).
5The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes our unique data and
presents the basic patterns of selection in terms of education and residual wages. Since
the pattern of emigrant selection on residual wages is inconsistent with the Borjas model,
Section 3 develops a model which can explain the observed patterns of selection on edu-
cation and residual wages. Section 4 tests the model’s predictions further by examining
whether variation in the relative (Israel versus the US) returns to education across sec-
tors can explain variation in the patterns of emigrant selection across sectors. Section
5 presents a similar analysis of emigrant selection on residual wages. Section 6 presents
some robustness checks. Section 7 discusses the magnitude of the coeﬃcients and Section
8c o n c l u d e s .
2T h e D a t a
The analysis uses a unique data set composed of the 1995 Israeli Census merged with an
indicator for whether each respondent left the country or not as of 2002 and as of 2004.
(We also received an indicator for whether the person died by 2002 or 2004.) If the person
is considered a “mover” (a person who has left Israel), then the data set contains variables
indicating the month and year when this person is considered to have left the country
permanently.
Deﬁn i n gw h oi sa ne m i g r a n ti sn o ts t r a i g h t f o rward. Many individuals travel abroad
intending to stay for only a short period of time, but gradually their stay becomes per-
manent. Others may intend to leave forever but change their mind. As a result, any
deﬁnition of a “mover” is somewhat arbitrary. In our analysis, we use the oﬃcial deﬁni-
tion used by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, which considers any individual as a
“mover” if he/she left the country for at least a full year.7 By design, the variable for being
a “mover” is intended to capture a long-term absence from the country. According to the
algorithm used by the Central Bureau of Statistics, a short visit back to Israel in the midst
of a long-term absence does not change the status from “mover” to being a “non-mover.”
There are a few potential weaknesses of the data worth noting. First, the data set
does not indicate why a person leaves and whether the person intends to come back or not.
The person may not know this information himself. Therefore, although we mainly use
the given measure of a “mover” throughout our analysis, we check the robustness of our
7The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics received information from the Interior Ministry about who
is leaving the country, which the Interior Ministry collects at the airports and borders according to the
personal identiﬁcation number.
6results by classifying only longer-term movers as “movers” (using the information about
when the person moved). In addition, as we discuss below, there is strong evidence to
believe that the measure we received is picking up moves which are indeed long term. A
second weakness in the data is that it does not contain information on where the person is
living if he/she resides outside of the state of Israel. However, the Global Migrant Origin
Database Version 4.0 indicates that the United States is by far the most likely destination
for Israeli emigrants.8 Therefore, we treat the United States as the “host” country of
interest. To the extent that the United States is not the actual destination for a particular
emigrant, this should only add noise to the analysis.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest from the 1995 Israeli Census
are presented in Table 1. Since the focus of the paper is to determine the selection of
emigrants in terms of their education and wages, we restrict the analysis to males with a
strong attachment to the labor force, who are old enough to ﬁnish their schooling (Israelis
typically start their BA studies at 22-24 years old) but young enough so that they are
not leaving for retirement purposes. Speciﬁcally, we restrict the sample to Jewish males
between the ages of 30 and 45 who were not self-employed (so their income measure is
reliable), worked at least 30 hours a week, worked at least six months in the previous year,
and are not ultra-orthodox.
Table 1 shows that the overall rate of emigration as of 2004 in this sample stands at
1.6 percent. The rate as of 2002 was 1.3 percent, so there appears to be an increase over
time. Over 67 percent of those characterized as “movers” in 2004 emigrated by the end of
2000. In addition, only two percent of those characterized as a “mover” in 2002 returned
to Israel by the end of 2004. So, our measure of a “mover” appears to be picking up longer
term stays abroad. Table 1 also contains means for the other variables used throughout the
analysis: education (13.0 years of education), age (37.7), native (61.4 percent were born
in Israel), marital status (90 percent married), number of children (2.13), and monthly
wages.
Although the overall rate of emigration appears to be rather low at 1.6 percent,
there are stark diﬀerences across levels of education and wages. Figure 1a presents the
rates of emigration across diﬀerent levels of education. The rate for those with a high
8The data in the Global Migrant Origin Database Version 4.0 is problematic since it is based on country
of birth, and many Israelis were not born in Israel. Also, it does not distinguish between Jewish and Arab
Israelis, while this study focuses on the emigration status of the Jewish population. However, according to
the database, 122,591 Israelis moved to the US and the next highest country (excluding Arab countries) is
Canada with a total of 17,393. Therefore, the United States is by far the most likely destination country.
7school education or less is about 1.1 percent, but the rate increases signiﬁcantly for college
graduates to 1.6 percent, and then jumps dramatically for those with an MA degree or
higher to 4.6 percent. The high emigration rate for the most educated Israelis has raised
concerns within Israel about a signiﬁcant “brain drain.” Figures 1a and 1b show similar
patterns for natives and non-natives, but the magnitudes are much higher for non-natives.9
It is worth noting that these patterns are not due to restricting our sample to those above
the age of 30, which could lead to a similar pattern if less-educated Israelis tend to leave in
their 20’s while more educated individuals wait until they ﬁnish schooling. Figure 2a shows
that the probability of emigrating increases with education even for those in their 20’s.
In addition, Figure 2b shows that emigration rates by 2004 for teenagers in 1995 increase
with their father’s education level. Therefore, all the evidence suggests that emigrants
are indeed positively selected according to family background and education during their
teenage years and into their mid-40’s.
The positive relationship between education and the rate of emigration is consistent
with the predictions of the Borjas model. Speciﬁcally, the Borjas model predicts that the
propensity to emigrate should increase with education in a country with a low return to
education in comparison to a potential host country. Indeed, conventional OLS estimates
of the returns to education in Israel are quite low. Table 2 presents Mincer-like wage
regressions using data from the US and Israel from the same period and using similar
sample selection criteria. The estimated return to education is 10.0 percent for the US and
only 7.1 percent for Israel. This diﬀerential is likely to be a factor which is generating the
positive relationship between education and emigration in Figures 1a and 1b. It is worth
noting that this relationship is positive and signiﬁcant after controlling for a host of other
demographic characteristics of the individual, as shown in a regression in the third column
of Table 2.
However, one potential explanation for the pattern exhibited in the ﬁgures could be
that individuals with higher education levels are more likely to spend time temporarily
abroad (sabbaticals, being stationed abroad by a ﬁrm or the government, etc.). However,
we ﬁnd no evidence to support this idea. Figure 3 shows that there is no discernible
relationship between education and the propensity to return between 2002 and 2004, given
that you were considered a “mover” in 2002. The last column of Table 2 conﬁrms that there
is no systematic pattern between “returning” and education levels even after controlling
9Gould and Moav (2007) show that the rate of emigration is very high for professors, scientists, doctors,
and engineers. All of these groups are at least three times higher than teachers or workers in all the rest
of the occupations.
8for other demographic characteristics and wages. Therefore, we believe that the patterns
in the data are unlikely to be picking up the tendency for highly educated individuals to
work for a year or two abroad.
However, the increasing likelihood of higher educated individuals to emigrate could
possibly be explained by other factors. For example, the costs of obtaining a work visa
or ﬁnding a job abroad may decline with education. Therefore, variation in the relative
returns to education is needed to truly test the predictions of the Borjas model. To do
this, we estimate the returns to education within sectors in the United States using the
same speciﬁcation used in the ﬁrst column of Table 2, and within sectors in Israel using
the speciﬁcation in second column of Table 2. Table 3 presents the estimated returns
to education in the US and Israel when the sectors are deﬁn e db yi n d u s t r y ,a n dT a b l e4
presents the estimates when the sector is deﬁned by occupation. In our main empirical
analysis, we will exploit variation in the relative returns to education (Israel versus the
US) across sectors to test the predictions of Borjas model regarding the selection of Israeli
emigrants from each sector.
A l t h o u g hm o s to ft h el i t e r a t u r ee x a m i n i n gt h eB o r j a sm o d e ll o o k sa tw h e t h e rt h e r ei s
a positive or negative selection of emigrants according to their education (observable skills),
the model in Borjas (1987) also applies to unobservable skills. We measure the returns
to unobservable skill with residual inequality (see Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)). The
ﬁrst two columns in Table 2 show that the residual variation is higher in the US versus
Israel, after controlling for a similar set of demographic characteristics. Speciﬁcally, the
“Root MSE” from the Mincer-like wage regression is 0.523 for the US and 0.498 for Israel.
According to the Borjas model, the higher return to unobservable skill in the US should
entice individuals with higher residual wages to emigrate. However, a simple descriptive
analysis is not consistent with this prediction. The third column in Table 2 shows that
wages are not a signiﬁcant predictor of who moves, and Figure 4 shows that the propensity
to emigrate increases with residual wages and then declines. That is, it is not the case that
no pattern exists at all between residual wages and the propensity to leave Israel. Rather,
the pattern is non-linear — characterized by an inverse U-shape. Apparently, individuals
with very low residual wages and very high residual wages are less likely to emigrate than
those in the middle of the distribution, which is not consistent with a simple Borjas model.
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, this pattern persists even after controlling for twelve industry
categories or eight occupation groups.
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) also found that, in contrast to the predictions of the
9Borjas model, emigrants from Mexico come from the middle part of the education distri-
bution rather than being concentrated in the lower tail (since the returns to education in
Mexico are higher than they are in the US). They reconciled their ﬁndings by including
in the Borjas model a cost of emigration which declines with education. Therefore, they
explain the lower rate of emigration by low educated workers in Mexico by their high costs
of moving, and the lower rate of emigration of highly educated workers by the higher re-
turn to education in Mexico. Our case is obviously diﬀerent, since our evidence regarding
the nature of the selection on education (observable skills) is entirely consistent with the
Borjas model with or without including a cost of emigration which declines with education.
More importantly, the adapted model by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) cannot explain the
inverse U-shape in our data regarding unobservable skills — moving costs which decline
with residual wages would make those at the top of the residual wage distribution the
most likely to leave the country, whereby we are trying to explain why those in the middle
l e a v ea tt h eh i g h e s tr a t e s .O u rﬁnding that those at the top do not leave at high rates may
be due to the idea that some factors of their success are unlikely to be transported to the
US.
In the next section, we formally show that incorporating the idea that some skills are
“country-speciﬁc” into the model can generate the inverse U-shaped relationship between
residual wages and the likelihood of emigrating. In this sense, the U-shaped pattern is
consistent with our model, but it may also be the result of unobserved factors. Again,
variation in the returns to unobservable skill is needed to test the implications of our model,
and for this purpose, we estimate the returns to unobserved skill in each sector using the
same set of regressions within each sector described above regarding the estimation of the
rates of return to education in each sector. The “root mean squared error” from each
regression is the estimated return to unobserved skill in each sector in the US and Israel,
and Tables 3 and 4 present these estimates for the diﬀerent industries and occupations. In
our main empirical analysis, we will exploit variation in the relative returns to unobservable
skills (Israel versus the US) across sectors to test the predictions of our model regarding
the nature of the selection of emigrants with regard to unobservable skills.
3 A Model of Emigration with Country-Speciﬁc Skills
In this section, we present a model of the emigration decision which considers the idea that
some skills are “general” in the sense of being rewarded highly in a foreign country, while
10some are not valued much at all in a foreign country, and therefore, are more “country-
speciﬁc” in nature. A signiﬁcant portion of an individual’s total human capital is likely to
be country-speciﬁc for several reasons. First, any skill which is “ﬁrm-speciﬁc” is likely to be
country-speciﬁc as well. Second, language and cultural barriers may prevent an individual
from transferring their skills to a country where they lack a commanding knowledge of
the local language, cultural of business practices, consumer tastes, laws, and regulations.
Third, if a person’s success is at least partially due to luck (being in the right place at
the right time), good luck may not be transferable abroad. Fourth, many individuals with
high incomes became successful due to personal connections with local individuals and
authorities, and these connections will not be useful in a foreign country. For these and
other reasons, it is very likely that some people will not be able to translate their success
to a foreign country.
The model consists of individuals living in the source country (country 0) and decid-
ing whether or not to emigrate to the host country (country 1). An individual’s wage in the
source country, w0, is determined by his level of education, e, and by his unobservable (to
the econometrician) skills. Unobservable skills are composed of skills which are country-
speciﬁc, s, and skills which are more general, g. Following the literature, education is
considered a general skill which is also observable. An individual’s wage, w0, in the source
country is modeled by:
w0 = a0 + e + g + s, (1)
where a0 is the intercept of the wage function and is constant across individuals. Without
loss of generality, the returns to each type of skill (e, g,a n ds) are normalized to one in
country 0. The two unobservable components, s and g, are distributed independently with
a uniform distribution over the unit interval,
s˜U[0,1];
g˜U[0,1].
Using the uniform distribution simpliﬁes the analysis, but is not crucial for the qualitative
results. In Appendix Figures 1-3, we present simulations that show that the main results
hold for the normal distribution and when we allow for a negative or positive correlation
between s and g.
If an individual chooses to emigrate to the host country (country 1), he will receive
11the following wage (net of the direct cost of moving to another country),
w1 = a1 + β1e + γ1g − f, (2)
where a1 is the intercept of the wage function in country 1,β 1 and γ1 are the returns to e
and g in country 1, and f is the direct cost of relocating which is considered identical across
all individuals. Although several papers model the cost of moving as a decreasing function
of education (Chiswick (1999) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2005)), adding this element to
the model will only strengthen the results for positive selection on education, but would
not enable us to understand the inverse u-shaped pattern of emigration rates according to
residual wages, as depicted in the preceding section.10 The key assumption of the model
is that some skills are valued much more in the source country versus the host country,
which we simplify in the model by setting the return to unobserved country-speciﬁc skills,
s, to zero in country 1.
We restrict our analysis to the case where the returns to education and general
skills are higher in the host country versus the source country, since Section II shows that
this appears to be the case for Israelis who are considering a move to the United States.
Formally, this assumption is represented by β1 ≥ 1 and γ1 ≥ 1.
Following the framework developed by Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987), the decision
to emigrate is based on wage maximization. Therefore, individuals emigrate if and only
if w1 >w 0. Based on equations (1) and (2), this condition holds if and only if:
βe+ γg > a+ s (3)
where a =( a0 −a1)+f is the total ﬁxed-cost of emigration (the diﬀerence in the constant
plus the direct cost of relocating), β = β1 −1 ≥ 0, and γ = γ1 −1 ≥ 0. The parameters β
and γ are the diﬀerences in the returns between country 1 and country 0 to education and
general skills respectively. Hence, the right hand side of equation (3), a + s, is the total
emigration cost including the loss of speciﬁc skills, whereas the left hand side, βe + γg,
is the gain from emigration. Naturally, an individual decides to emigrate if the gain is
greater than the costs.
10The other papers use the declining costs of emigration to explain why emigrants are not negatively
selected when the return to education in the source country (Mexico) is higher than the return in the
host country (United States). Since the returns to education are lower in Israel versus the United States,
adding this element to the model only reinforces the positive selection of Israeli emigrants in terms of
education. Formally, making the direct cost relocating, f, a function of education or general skills, is
equivalent to a change in the diﬀerence in the relative returns to education or general skills between the
two countries. This has no qualitative impact on the model, unless the cost is increasing with skill and/or
education in a rate that can reverse the direction of the diﬀerence. However, given the literature which
argues that the costs decline with skill, this possibility is not very reasonable.
12As stated above, an individual’s unobservable component of income in country 0 is
represented by s + g. This sum is called the individual’s “residual wage,” and is denoted
by ˜ w, i.e.,
˜ w = s + g.
Since both s and g are distributed uniformly over the unit interval, it follows that the
residual wage, ˜ w, is distributed between 0 and 2. In order to focus the model on the most
realistic range of results, a few restrictions on the parameters are useful. In particular, we
restrict the parameters so that not everyone emigrates. Since the returns to education, e,
and general skills, g, are higher in country 1, individuals with a high level of e and g are
the most likely to gain from emigration. Equation (3) formally illustrates this point, as
the beneﬁts of emigration increase with both e and g. Therefore, in order to ensure that
not everyone emigrates, we assume that for any individual characterized by the minimum
levels of education and general skills (g = e =0 ) , the return to emigration is negative,
w1 <w 0. (If this holds, then it holds for any level of s as well.) Formally, we assume that:
a>0, (A1)
so that condition (3) does not hold for any individual characterized by g = e =0 , regardless
of s. Assumption A1 implies that a positive total ﬁxed-cost of emigrating, represented by
a, causes those with the least to gain from emigration to choose not to emigrate.
Next, we focus on a diﬀerent set of individuals who are very unlikely to emigrate —
those with low education and high country-speciﬁc skills. The condition in equation (3)
shows that the net beneﬁts of emigration increase with e and decline with s — the latter
result stemming from the high loss of country-speciﬁc skills should the individual choose
to move. The only reason individuals with low e and high s would ever choose to emigrate
is because the return to g is extremely high in country 1. Therefore, to preclude this
unreasonable case, we restrict the return to g in country 1 to be no more than double the
return to g in country 0. Formally, we assume that:
γ<1, (A2)
which assures that equation (3) does not hold for any individual with e =0and s =1 ,
regardless of g.
Although low educated individuals are the ones most likely to stay, we do not restrict
all of them to do so. In fact, we restrict the parameters so that not everyone with the
13lowest education chooses to stay. In particular, for an individual with the lowest education
(e =0 ), equation (3)h o l d si fgγ > a + s, which is most likely to be satisﬁed if g is high
and s is low. Therefore, we assume that the return to g is suﬃciently high so that:
γ>a , (A3)
assuring that condition (3) holds for an individual with g =1and s =0 , regardless of e
(as long as β ≥ 0).
We now derive the probability of emigration for any individual with a given level
of education e a n dag i v e nr e s i d u a lw a g e , ˜ w. We condition on these two variables since
these are observable to the econometrician, while the individual components of the residual
wage, g and s, are not observable. Since the distributions of g and s are uniform and
independent, it follows that for any given ˜ w, g is uniformly distributed in its feasible
range.11 In particular, the conditional distribution of g given ˜ w is given by:
g˜U[0, ˜ w] for ˜ w ≤ 1;
g˜U[˜ w − 1,1] for ˜ w ≥ 1,
These properties allow for a straightforward calculation of the probability that an indi-
vidual with any given ˜ w and e will emigrate, which we denote by p(˜ w;e). As follows from
equation (3), and noting that s =˜ w − g, p(˜ w;e) is given by:




a − βe+˜ w
1+γ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ˜ w
¶
.
We further suppose that a is suﬃciently large relative to β, so that the distribution
of e is bounded from above by a/β. This implies that the return to education in country 1
versus country 0 is not so large that a majority of highly educated people decide to emigrate.
(This coincides with the case of Israel — the highest emigration rates are for those with
MA degrees, but the rate is still only 4.6% over the seven-year period we study.) This
assumption implies that the residual wage, and not just the level of education, plays an
inﬂuential role in the decision to emigrate. Our assumption that e is bounded from above
by a/β, implies that a − βe > 0.12 All proofs are in the appendix.
11Note that the probability that s + g ∈ (w − ε,w + ε), for ε → 0, for any given g, such that ˜ w − g<1
is independent of g,and therefore the conditional probability of s and g for any given ˜ w are uniform in the
feasible range.
12We brieﬂy discuss below the case where a − βe < 0.
14Proposition 1 (The properties of p(˜ w,e)). Under Assumptions A1-A3 and as long as
a − βe > 0,
1. The probability that an individual decides to emigrate is:
p(˜ w,e)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩












(2− ˜ w)(1+γ) for ˜ w ∈ [1,1+γ − (a − βe))
0 for ˜ w ≥ 1+γ − (a − βe)
(5)
where,




4. 1+γ − (a − βe) ∈ (1,2)
5. p(1,e) ∈ (0,1/2)





7. p(˜ w,e) is decreasing and concave with respect to ˜ w for ˜ w ∈ (1,1+γ − (a − βe)).
According to Proposition 1, the probability to emigrate is an inverse u-shaped func-
tion of the residual wage, ˜ w, if β and γ are not too high and a is suﬃciently high. The
intuition is rather straightforward. Generally speaking, individuals with a low residual in-
come have low levels of both general and country-speciﬁcs k i l l s( g and s). A low g implies
that the individual has a limited incentive to emigrate in order to enjoy the higher return
to g in country 1, while a low s means that he will suﬀer a small loss in terms of losing his
country-speciﬁc capital if he moves. These eﬀects oﬀset each other, so that the net gain to
emigration for this individual is modest, and therefore, he will tend not to emigrate due to
the signiﬁcant ﬁxed-costs of emigration, a. On the other end of the spectrum, individuals
with very high residual wages will tend to have high levels of general and country-speciﬁc
skills. For these individuals, a high level of g implies a larger beneﬁt to emigrating, while
a large s m e a n st h a th ew i l ls u ﬀer a severe loss of country-speciﬁc skills. That is, similar
to the individual with a low residual wage, the ratio of g to s is close to one, and therefore,
the costs and beneﬁts of emigration roughly cancel each other out. As a result, a signiﬁ-
cant level of ﬁxed emigration costs will prevent individuals with a high residual wage from
leaving the country in large numbers.
Now, consider those in the middle of the residual wage distribution. In this range,
individuals have varying levels of s and g. Those with high levels of s versus g will behave
similar to those at the tails of the distribution since the loss of country-speciﬁcs k i l l sa n d
15the ﬁxed-costs will prevent them from leaving at a large rate. However, in the middle of
the distribution, there is a signiﬁcant group of people with high levels of g relative to s,
and for those individuals, the return to emigration is high enough to produce the largest
rate of emigration within the population. As a result, the rate of emigration tends to be
larger in the middle of the residual wage distribution than in the tails.13
It is important to note how our results diﬀer from the existing framework developed
by Borjas (1987). In his model, the selection of immigrants in terms of “unobservable
skill” is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the correlation of unobservable skills in the source
and host countries. Our model is diﬀerent since the correlation between an individual’s
unobservable skill in both countries is diﬀerent across people, rather than being a single
parameter. In particular, due to the variation in the level of country-speciﬁcs k i l l sa c r o s s
people, some individuals stand to lose a large portion of their total unobservable skill
and some would lose virtually nothing. That is, our model produces a diﬀe r e n tr a t eo f
transferability of unobservable skill across people according to the relative size of each
component of unobservable skill. By showing that a larger proportion of individuals with
a higher transferability rate of unobservable skills (i.e. those with a high g relative to
s) exists in the middle of the distribution of total unobservable skill (i.e. the residual
wage), our model is able to explain the inverse u-shaped pattern of emigration in relation
to unobservable skill.
We now examine the eﬀect of education on the shape of the probability function of
emigrating, p(˜ w,e).
Proposition 2 (The eﬀect of e on p(˜ w,e)).Under Assumptions A1-A3 and as long as














13It should be noted that the inverse u-shaped relationship between the residual wage and the probability
of emigration does not depend on our assumption that the two components of the residual, s and g, are
uncorrelated. The u-shape patterns persists for any type of correlation except for the case where they are
perfectly, positively correlated (which would produce positive selection). However, the u-shaped pattern
becomes ﬂatter when the correlations becomes more positive. Interestingly, a negative correlation will
strengthen the inverse u-shape pattern, since a more negative correlation would increase the variance in
the distribution of s and g in the middle of the distribution of their sum, and hence a higher probability
of g exceeding its threshold level for triggering emigration. Also, it is worth noting that the results do




> 0 for ˜ w ∈ (1,1+γ − (a − βe))
Part 1 of Proposition 2 implies that the probability of emigrating increases with the
level of education. In other words, emigrants are positively selected in terms of their
education, which follows from the higher return to education in country 1 versus country
0, β>0. This result and its mechanism is similar to the prediction in Borjas (1987).
However, Proposition 2 demonstrates that the marginal eﬀect of e on p is decreasing with ˜ w
for ˜ w<1 (part 2), and increasing with ˜ w for ˜ w>1 (part 3). That is, the inverse u-shaped
pattern of p(˜ w,e), with respect to ˜ w is shifting up and ﬂattening out as e increases.
For the case where a − βe < 0, the results are generally in the opposite direction:
p(˜ w,e)=1f o rb o t hh i g ha n dl o wl e v e l so f ˜ w, and the lowest value of p(˜ w,e) is in the
middle of the distribution of ˜ w (˜ w =1 ) . Since this pattern is not observed in the data, we
focus our analysis on the case where a − βe > 0.
We now examine how the pattern of emigration across diﬀerent levels of ˜ w changes
as the return to g increases in country 1.
Proposition 3 (“mean preserving spread”) A rise in the return to unobservable general
skills in the host country versus the source country, γ, and in the ﬁxed cost of emigrating,
a, such that p(1,e) is held constant, generates a decline in p(˜ w,e) for ˜ w<1, and a rise in
p(˜ w,e) for ˜ w>1.
It follows from Proposition 3 that a rise in γ,while holding p(1;e) constant, generates
a shift to the right in p(˜ w;e) around the point p(1;e). In other words, a higher relative
return to unobservable general skills in country 1, while holding p(1;e) constant, maintains
the overall u-shaped pattern of emigration according to residual wages, but shifts the whole
curve to the right (raising emigration rates for those with high residuals and lowering the
rate for low residual wages).
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i sr e s u l ti sa sf o l l o w s . F o rag i v e ne, the decision to emigrate
depends on both g and s. The beneﬁts of emigration increase with g, while the costs
increase with s. Therefore, as ˜ w increases, the sum of s and g increases, which implies that
the threshold level of g, above which individuals choose to emigrate, increases with ˜ w. To
derive this formally, the condition for a person with any given ˜ w to decide to emigrate,
17given by equation (3), can be re-written as,
βe+ γg > a+˜ w − g,
where ˜ w − g = s. Re-arranging implies: βe+( 1+γ)g>a+˜ w, and therefore, for any ˜ w
and e, there exists a threshold level of g, denoted by ˆ g(˜ w,e), such that equation (3) holds
with equality:
ˆ g(˜ w,e)=
a − βe+˜ w
1+γ
.
Hence, the threshold level of g is increasing with ˜ w, and therefore a rise in the diﬀerence
in the return to general skills, γ, has a stronger impact on individuals with larger residual
wages, ˜ w. This can also be seen from equation (3), where the marginal beneﬁto fe m i g r a t i n g
with respect to γ is equal to g. Therefore, those with higher g are more sensitive to changes
in γ. This general result is independent of the speciﬁc “mean preserving spread” exercise
performed in the proposition.14
We now examine how the positive selection of emigrants, as shown in Proposition
2, is aﬀected by changes in the relative returns to education between the two countries.
To do this, we derive the probability of emigrating as a function only of education, and
discuss its properties.
Proposition 4 (the eﬀect of education on the emigration probability) Under A1-A3, for
β>0:
1. The probability of emigrating as a function of education is:
p(e)=

















3. The probability of emigrating as a function of education increases and becomes













14Ar i s ei nt h eﬁxed cost, a, has a negative eﬀect on the emigration probability. However, this eﬀect
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Proposition 4 states once again that emigrants are positively selected in terms of
education (part 1), and that the shape of the relationship between education and the
probability of emigrating is convex (part 2). Part 3 of the proposition indicates that an
increase in the return to education in the host country makes the curve shift up and become
steeper. In other words, an increase in the return to education in country 1 increases the
overall level of emigration from country 0, and intensiﬁes the positive selection of those
that choose to emigrate in terms of education levels.
Although g is not observable to the econometrician, we now describe the patterns of
emigration in relation to diﬀerent levels of this general skill. As follows from the emigration
condition (3), for any level of g and e, there is a threshold level of speciﬁc skills s, below
which the individual decides to emigrate:
ˆ s = γg − (a − βe).
Noting that under the restriction that a−βe > 0 there is a threshold level of g =( a−βe)/γ




0 g<(a − βe)/γ;
γg − (a − βe) g ∈ [(a − βe)/γ,1],
where it follows from our restrictions (g ≤ 1 and γ<1) that the probability of emigration
is strictly smaller than 1 for any g as long as a−βe > 0. Hence, above the threshold level,
the emigration rate is a linear increasing function with a slope equal to γ. Similar to the
results regarding the observable general skill, e, a higher return to g in country 1 versus
c o u n t r y0g e n e r a l l yp r o d u c e sp ositive selection in terms of g.
Overall, the theory presented in this section shows that a higher return to observable
and unobservable general skills in the host country versus the source country, combined
with the presence of country-speciﬁc skills in the source country, can generate the patterns
in the data seen in Section II. In particular, the model shows that emigrants are positively
selected in terms of their education, and that the relationship is convex (as shown in
Figures 1a and 1b). However, the relationship between emigration rates and residual
wages exhibits an inverse u-shaped pattern (as shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6). Increases in
the returns to either type of skill in country 1 increase the positive selection of emigrants
19in terms of either skill, but keep the overall shape of the curve intact. These results
demonstrate the general idea that there may be a non-monotonic relationship found in
many countries between emigration and skill based on many other factors, but the basic
premise of the Borjas model may still be relevant — an increase in inequality abroad shifts
the curve in a way that intensiﬁes the level of positive selection. In the next section, we
examine the empirical relevance of the model’s predictions.
4 Selection on Observables (Education)
The goal of this section is to test whether a lower relative return to education in Israel
versus the US intensiﬁes the positive relationship between education and the propensity
to leave Israel (Propositions 2 and 4). With information on each individual in Israel
before he makes the decision to leave the country or not, the basic regression speciﬁcation
explains the probability that person i who works in sector j (before leaving Israel) decides
to emigrate from Israel by the following equation:
Pr(Moverij)=γ0 + γ1xi + γ2educi + γ3(residual wage)ij + γ4(residual wage)
2
ij
+γ5(Israel ROR Educ)j + γ6(US ROR Educ)j
+β1(Israel ROR Educ)j · educi + β2(US ROR Educ)j · educi
+αj + εi
where:
Moverij is an indicator equal to one if the person emigrates from Israel and is zero
otherwise;
xi is a vector of personal characteristics (age, marital status, number of children in
the household, an indicator for being a native Israeli or not, age that the person moved
to Israel (if he is not a native)), and dummy variables for ethnicity (European descent or
Middle Eastern descent);
educi is the number of completed years of schooling by person i;
residual wageij is the individual’s residual from a standard Mincer-like wage re-
gression from the 1995 Israel Census using observations of workers in sector j (regressing
wages on education, age, age squared, marital status, and indicators for ethnic status and
immigrant status);
20Israel ROR Educj is the estimated return to education from the 1995 Israel Census
in sector j in the regression described above for estimating the residual wage for each
person in sector j;
US ROR Educj is the estimated return to education from the US CPS (combining
1994, 1995, and 1996) within workers in sector j using the speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst column
of Table 2;
αj is a ﬁxed-eﬀect for sector j;a n dεi is the error term.
The coeﬃcient γ2 will determine whether there is a general relationship between
schooling and the probability to leave Israel, while γ3 and γ4 will indicate whether higher
residual wages within a given individual’s sector increase or decrease the probability of em-
igrating (and whether the relationship is linear or non-linear). The analysis uses “residual
wages” as a proxy for the return to unobservable skill, so that we can explicitly separate the
eﬀect of observable skill (education) from unobservable skill on the probability of leaving
Israel. For both Israel and the US, we use estimates for the return to education in sector j
as a proxy for the return to observable skill (education) in sector j in each country (using
the speciﬁcations in the wage regressions in Table 2).
I nt h ec o n t e x to ft h em o d e l ,t h em a i nc o e ﬃcients of interest are β1 and β2.T h e
model has no clear predictions on whether a higher relative return to observable skill will
increase or decrease the overall rate of emigration from the source country. In fact, with
the inclusion of ﬁxed-eﬀects for each sector, the parameters on these variables (γ5 and γ6)
are not even identiﬁed. The model does predict, however, that a lower (higher) relative
return to skill in Israel versus the US will entice higher (lower) skilled workers to leave
Israel. Formally, this prediction is represented by β1 < 0 and β2 > 0. These parameters
are identiﬁed by exploiting variation across sectors in the diﬀerence between Israel and the
US in the returns to education within each sector, and testing for whether the probability
of emigration increases (decreases) with education in sectors with a lower (higher) return
to education in Israel versus the United States.
It is important to emphasize that we are not assuming that all emigrants move to
the US, although as indicated previously, the US is by far the most likely destination for
Israeli emigrants. Nor do we assume that Israeli emigrants do not change sectors (there
are too few observations in the 2000 U.S. Census to conduct a serious analysis of the Israeli
emigrants in our sample living in the US). Rather, we allow the regression to answer the
question of whether these factors are empirically relevant. If Israelis do not consider the
relative returns to skill between the US and Israel within their own sector (and how it
21interacts with their own skill level), then the causal eﬀect of these variables should be zero
(β1 =0and β2 =0 ) , and the estimates should be insigniﬁcant.
The inclusion of sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀects controls for any unobserved heterogene-
ity in tastes for emigration across sectors. Therefore, the main identifying assumption
throughout the paper is that the diﬀerence between the US and Israel in the estimated
return to skill (either the return to education or the residual variation) within a sector
is not systematically correlated with an unobserved taste for emigration by higher skilled
individuals relative to lower skilled individuals.
In terms of deﬁning the sectors, we use either the twelve industrial sectors depicted
in Table 3 or the nine occupations in Table 4. Sectors have to be deﬁned rather broadly so
that we can obtain reasonable estimates of the returns to education and residual variation
(used in the next section) within each sector. Also, we need a reasonable number of
emigrants within each sector in order to test for selection. Tables 3 and 4 present the
returns to education within each sector in Israel and the US. Diﬀerences in these estimates
across sectors are the source of the “treatment variation” that is exploited in the empirical
analysis.15
Table 5 presents the main analysis for selection on observable skill when sectors are
deﬁned by the twelve industries displayed in Table 3. The coeﬃcients presented in all of
the regression tables represent the estimated marginal eﬀect of each explanatory variable
(evaluated at the means of all the explanatory variables). The ﬁrst column of Table 5
shows the estimates of the regression equation using ﬁxed-eﬀects for each industry, but
using only the returns to education in Israel (excluding the return to education in the
United States). The results show that education is positively and signiﬁcantly related to
the probability of emigrating (Proposition 2), and the coeﬃcients on the residual wage
and its quadratic term (γ3 and γ4) indicate that the relationship between emigration and
residual wages is concave, which is consistent with Proposition 1. However, we postpone
our discussion of selection on unobservables until the next section which is dedicated to
this issue alone.
The main parameter of interest in the ﬁrst column of Table 5 is not signiﬁcant — the
interaction of education with the return to education in Israel. In the second column, we
15Although there is a large literature which examines the bias in the estimated returns to schooling
using a standard Mincer-like regression, this issue should only aﬀect our results if the biases across sectors
and between the US and Israel are somehow systematically related to the selection of workers within a
sector. If the estimated returns to schooling are biased, this should only add noise to the regression. It
is diﬃcult to imagine why diﬀerential biases between the US and Israel across sectors would somehow be
correlated with the relationship between skill and the propensity to emigrate.
22include only the return to education in the US, thus omitting the return to education in
Israel. In this speciﬁcation, the interaction between education and the return to education
in the US is positive and signiﬁcant, and indicates that higher educated Israelis tend to
l e a v eI s r a e lm o r ei ft h e yw o r ki nas e c t o rw h i c hh a sah i g hr e t u r nt oe d u c a t i o ni nt h e
United States. The direction of this eﬀect is consistent with the predictions of the model
— positive selection is larger in a sector with a higher return to general skills abroad.
The third column of Table 5 includes the returns to education in the US and Israel.
Interestingly, both of the main parameters of interest are now signiﬁcant, and the magni-
tudes are much larger than in the ﬁrst two columns. For example, the interaction between
education and the return to education in Israel increases in size from -0.015 to -0.093, while
the interaction of education with the return to education in the US increases from 0.020
to 0.051. The fact that the coeﬃcients of interest are much bigger and signiﬁcant when
we include the interaction terms for the US and Israel together in the same regression is
an important result in the context of the model. When we exclude the returns to skill in
the US in column (1), the non-signiﬁcant results for the interaction of education with the
Israeli return to education indicate that high skilled workers are not generally more likely
to leave Israel if they work in an industry with a low return to education. This is proba-
bly due to the positive correlation between the two countries in the returns to education.
Therefore, a sector that has a high return to skill in Israel most likely has a high return as
well in the US, and since the eﬀect of the former is negative and the latter is positive, the
coeﬃcients are biased towards zero when we exclude the returns to skills in either country.
This pattern of results highlights the importance of using variation in the relative returns
t os k i l lb e t w e e nt h es o u r c ea n dp o t e n t i a lh o s tc o u n t r y ,a n dn o tj u s tr e l y i n go nt h er e t u r n s
to skill in the source country in order to identify the parameters of the model.
Our ﬁnding that the relative returns between Israel and the US, and not the absolute
returns in Israel, are what matters is strong evidence in favor of the implications of the
model. In addition, the fact that the results are highly sensitive to the inclusion of the US
measures of the returns to skill indicate that our measured returns to skill in the US and
Israel are not simply measures of noise which are fraught with biases and measurement
error. If this were the case, they should not be signiﬁcant determinants of the probability
to emigrate, and they should not be inﬂuencing the other coeﬃcients to such a high degree.
T h el a s tc o l u m no fT a b l e5u s e sas p e c i ﬁcation which interacts a person’s education
level with the diﬀerence in the returns to education between Israel and the US in his
sector. Using this speciﬁcation, the main parameter of interest is highly signiﬁcant: the
23probability of emigrating for Israelis with higher levels of education declines in sectors with
a higher relative return to education in Israel versus the US. This result is consistent with
the predictions of our model.
It is worth noting that these results are highly unlikely to be due to US immigration
policy. Although US immigration authorities do consider the skill level and sector of work
for each Israeli applying for a visa, the regressions control for sector-speciﬁce ﬀects, and
it is highly unlikely that US immigration authorities are running regressions within each
sector in the US and Israel, and tailoring their policies to the relative returns within each
sector between the US and a small country like Israel.
Table 6 presents the main results for selection on education after deﬁning sectors
according to occupations. It is important to note that the “wage residual” for each in-
dividual is not the same one used in the analysis using industries as sectors. The “wage
residual” is now taken from regressions within the individual’s occupation, rather than
each individual’s industry. Also, the returns to education in the US and Israel are now
computed for occupations rather than industries.
Overall, the results using occupations as sectors are similar to those using industries
in one respect, but diﬀer in a few important ways. They are similar in the sense that
higher educated Israelis tend to leave occupations with a low return to education in Israel.
However, higher educated Israelis also tend not to leave Israel if the return to education
in their occupation in the US is higher. The former result is consistent with the model
but the later one is not. In the last column of Table 6, the interaction of education with
the diﬀerence in the returns to education between Israel and the US yields an insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient, since the individual coeﬃcients (in the ﬁrst three columns) are of a similar
magnitude and have the same sign. That is, the last column masks the two individual
eﬀects. However, even though one of the coeﬃcients has an unexpected sign, it is worth
noting that the size of the coeﬃcients in the occupation level analysis are considerably
smaller than the ones obtained in the industry-level analysis — less than half the magnitude
of the coeﬃcients in Table 5. Also, the diﬀerence in the results could be due to the idea that
occupational status is already somewhat of a proxy for education, so testing for selection
within occupations is really a test of selection within very small ranges of education. In
contrast, the larger selection eﬀects obtained in the industry-level analysis are most likely
a product of exploiting a broader range of education levels within each industry.
We now examine the sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent sample selection criteria
and to diﬀerent ways of deﬁn i n ga“ m o v e r . ”F o rt h es a k eo fp a r s i m o n y ,w ep r e s e n to n l y
24the coeﬃcient on the interaction between a person’s education level with the diﬀerence in
the return to education between Israel and the US in his sector (industry or occupation).
We present results for both the industry and occupation level analysis, but restrict our
discussion to the industry analysis since using occupations as sectors yields a consistently
non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
Table 7 presents the results for three diﬀerent sample selection criteria. The ﬁrst
column replicates the last column of Tables 5 and 6, while the next two columns compare
the results obtained for natives versus non-natives (those not born in Israel). Figures 1a and
1b show that non-natives have a higher rate of emigration, and that the positive relationship
between education and the probability of emigrating is steeper as well. However, Table 7
shows that the results are more signiﬁcant for natives rather than non-natives, although
the sign of the coeﬃcients for both groups are consistent with the model in the industry
analysis. One possible explanation for the non-signiﬁcant results for non-natives could be
that many of those who choose to leave Israel are moving back to Russia, and therefore,
measures of the returns to skill in the US may be less relevant for them. In the last column
of Table 7, we delete industries with a small sample size from the regression (less than
1,000 observations), and the results are very similar to the results obtained from the entire
sample. Therefore, the results are not coming from small sectors with inﬂuential outliers.
Table 8 presents results for diﬀe r e n tw a y so fd e ﬁning a “mover.” The ﬁrst two columns
compare the results obtained using “mover” status as of 2004 (the measure we have been
using up to now) to “mover” status as of 2002. The results are a little weaker and less
signiﬁcant, but are generally similar using both deﬁnitions. The third column deﬁnes a
“mover” as someone who is deﬁn e da sa“ m o v e r ”i nb o t h2 0 0 2a n d2 0 0 4 ,a n dt h er e s u l t s
are still very similar. The last column deﬁn e sam o v e ra ss o m e o n ew h oi sc a t e g o r i z e da sa
“mover” in 2004, but also has been out of the country since the end of 2000. Again, the
results are signiﬁcant but smaller in magnitude. Overall, the results appear to be robust to
conﬁning the status of “mover’ only to those who have been out of the country for several
years. We will discuss the magnitude of the results later, but ﬁr s tw ep r e s e n tas i m i l a r
analysis for the selection of emigrants on unobservable skill.
5 Selection on Unobservables (Residual Wages)
The section analyzes the prediction of Proposition 1 that the rate of emigration should be
an increasing and then decreasing function of the residual wage, and Proposition 3’s pre-
25diction that a higher relative return to unobservable skill in Israel versus the US increases
the probability that individuals with higher unobserved skill will emigrate (i.e. shift the
inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and residual wages to the right). The
basic regression speciﬁcation explains the probability that person i who works in sector j
(before leaving Israel) decides to emigrate from Israel by the following equation:
Pr(Moverijk)=γ0 + γ1xi + γ2educi + γ3(residual wage)ij + γ4(residual wage)
2
ij
+β3(Israel residual SD)jk · (residual wage)ij
+β4(US residual SD)jk · (residual wage)ij
+αjk + εi
w h e r ee a c hv a r i a b l ei sd e ﬁned as before except:
Israel residual SDjk is the standard deviation of the residuals within sector j and
education group k (k=1 if person i is a high school dropout, k=2 if person i completed only
high school, and k=3 if person i completed college) from the wage regression described
above for estimating the residual wage for each person in sector j in the 1995 Israel Census;
USresidualSDjk is the standard deviation of residuals within sector j and education
group k from the wage regression described above using the speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst column
o fT a b l e2w i t hw o r k e r si ns e c t o rj in the US CPS data;
αjk is a ﬁxed-eﬀect for education group k in sector j;a n dεi is the error term.
The analysis uses a person’s residual wage within a sector as a measure of his unob-
servable skill, and the residual variation in sector j for education group k as a proxy for
the return to unobservable skill in sector j and education group k.16 With the inclusion of
ﬁxed-eﬀects for each sector and education group, the direct eﬀect of the residual variance
in each sector and education group is not identiﬁed. Therefore, the main coeﬃcients of
interest are β3,a n dβ4. According to the model, a lower (higher) relative return to skill in
Israel versus the US will entice workers with higher (lower) residual wages to leave Israel.
Formally, this prediction is represented by β3 < 0 and β4 > 0. The main identifying as-
sumption is that the diﬀerences between Israel and the US in the residual variation across
16There are likely to be diﬀerences across education groups within a given sector in the returns to
unobservable skills, so the regression explicitly considers this possibility.
26cells is not correlated with an unobservable factor which can generate positive or negative
selection within each cell.
Table 9 presents the main analysis for selection on unobservable skill when sectors
are deﬁned by the twelve industries displayed in Table 3. The ﬁrst column of Table 9
includes the interaction of each person’s residual wage with the residual variation in his
sector in Israel (excluding the interaction with the residual variation in the United States).
The results show that the direct eﬀect of a person’s residual wage is positive (although
not signiﬁcant) while the quadratic term is very signiﬁcant and negative. This pattern
forms a non-linear relationship between residual wages and the probability of emigrating,
as predicted by Proposition 1 and seen in Figure 4. According to our model, this pattern
is indicative of the idea that residual wage is composed of two types of unobservable skills
— those that are “general” and can be transferable to the target country and those that
are “country-speciﬁc” to Israel, and therefore, cannot be transferred to another country.
However, the main parameter of interest in Table 9 is the coeﬃcient on the interaction
between a person’s residual wage and the residual variation in the person’s sector and
education cell. This coeﬃcient is negative, but not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst column of Table
9. Similarly, when we include the interaction term for the residual variation in the US, the
main parameter is not signiﬁcant. However, when we include the residual variation in both
Israel and the US together in the speciﬁcation, the interaction terms are much larger in
magnitude and marginally signiﬁcant. Moreover, the signs of the coeﬃcients are consistent
with the model — a higher return to unobservable skill in Israel induces individuals with
high levels of unobservable skill to stay, while higher returns to unobservable skill in the
US increase the chances for individuals with higher levels of unobservable skill to leave
Israel.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ec o e ﬃcients of interest are smaller in magnitude and signiﬁcance
when one of the interactions is deleted is indicative that individuals compare the relative
returns to skill across countries, rather than just looking at the return to skill in their own
country. This idea is explicitly modeled in the last column of Table 9 which interacts a
person’s residual wage with the diﬀerence in the returns to unobservable skill between Israel
and the US. The interaction term in this speciﬁcation is highly signiﬁcant and negative:
the probability of emigrating for Israelis with higher levels of unobservable skill declines
in sectors with a higher relative return to unobservable skill in Israel versus the US. This
result is consistent with Proposition 3.
Table 10 presents the main results for selection on unobservable skill after deﬁning
27sectors according to occupations. Overall, the pattern of results for the main parameters
of interest (the interaction terms) is very similar to the industry-level analysis in Table 9.
In fact, the magnitudes and signiﬁcance levels are higher than Table 9, and the sign of the
coeﬃcients once again are consistent with Proposition 3.
Therefore, in contrast to the results regarding the selection of emigrants in terms of
education levels, the results are very similar in terms of selection on unobservable skill in
the industry and occupation level analyses. Again, one possible explanation for this could
be that occupation is already a proxy for education, so this is likely to aﬀect the results
for selection on education levels in a way that does not aﬀect selection on unobservables
(since residuals are computed after controlling for occupation and education).
We now examine the sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent sample selection criteria
and to diﬀerent ways of deﬁning a “mover.” Table 11 presents the results for three diﬀerent
sample selection criteria. Although the magnitudes are similar for natives and non-natives
(actually a little bigger for the non-natives), the results are statistically signiﬁcant only for
the natives. In the last column of Table 11, we show that the results are similar even after
deleting sectors with a small sample size from the regression (less than 1,000 observations).
Therefore, the results are not coming from small sectors with inﬂuential outliers.
Table 12 presents results for diﬀerent ways of deﬁn i n ga“ m o v e r . ”T h eﬁrst two
columns compare the results obtained using “mover” status as of 2004 to “mover” status
as of 2002. The results are a little weaker and less signiﬁcant, but are generally similar
using both deﬁnitions. The third column deﬁnes a “mover” as someone who is deﬁned as
a “mover” in both 2002 and 2004, and the results are still very similar. The last column
deﬁnes a mover as someone who is categorized as a “mover” in 2004, but also has been
out of the country since the end of 2000. Again, the parameters of interest are signiﬁcant,
and indicate that the results are robust to conﬁning the status of “mover” only to those
who have been out of the country for several years.
6A F e w M o r e R o b u s t n e s s C h e c k s
Tables 13 and 14 present a few more robustness checks for the selection on education
and unobservable skill. The ﬁrst column in Table 13 replicates the benchmark results
used in previous tables. The second column uses the same speciﬁcations, but uses a
linear probability model (OLS) instead of a probit. The coeﬃcient estimates tend to be
considerably stronger and more signiﬁcant with OLS. The third column estimates the
28selection of unobservables, but includes an additional regressor for the interaction between
the diﬀerence in residual variation (Israel versus the US) within a person’s sector and the
square of his residual wage. Previous speciﬁcations only included the interaction with his
residual wage, not his residual wage squared. The coeﬃcients on the interaction with the
residual squared are not signiﬁcant, and the main interaction remains similar in size and
signiﬁcance. The last column in Table 13 uses an individual’s residual rank within his age
group (30-34, 35-39, and 40-45) instead of his actual residual wage in the analysis, since
the variance of residual wages tends to increase with age (see Lemieux (2006)). However,
the results using ranks instead of levels are still very similar.
In Table 14, we specify a regression which tests for selection on observable skill (ed-
ucation) and unobservable skill (residual wages) in the same regression. Up to now, we
estimated them separately in diﬀerent regressions, since the analysis for observables re-
quired using a ﬁxed-eﬀect for sector only, while the analysis for unobservables requires
a ﬁxed-eﬀect for each sector and education cell. Therefore, it is not appropriate to esti-
mate them together with ﬁxed-eﬀects for cells deﬁn e db ys e c t o ro rs e c t o r - e d u c a t i o nc e l l s . 17
However, despite these concerns, we now estimate the selection on observable and un-
observable skills in the same regression — using ﬁxed-eﬀects for the sector only and then
using ﬁxed-eﬀects for the sector-education cell. Table 13 presents these results for both the
industry and occupation level analysis. Overall, the results are very similar to all of the
previous estimates — a lower relative return to skill increases the level of positive selection
in unobservable skill for both the industry and occupation level analyses, while the results
for observable skill are signiﬁcant only for the industry level analysis. Essentially, the co-
eﬃcient estimates are unchanged from the analysis that estimates each type of selection
separately, and they are robust to whether the ﬁxed-eﬀect is at the sector level or whether
they are deﬁned by sector-education cells.
7 The Magnitude of the Coeﬃcients
So far, we found statistically signiﬁcant evidence in favor of increased positive selection
on observable and unobservable skill in sectors with a low relative return to skill in Israel
versus the US. However, the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are not easy to interpret from
17Using a ﬁxed-eﬀect for each sector and education cell when we test for selection on education means
we would be testing for selection on education within very small ranges of education, and therefore, we
believe this is not the appropriate speciﬁcation. Furthermore, including a ﬁxed-eﬀect for sector only in
the analysis on unobservable skill is not entirely appropriate since the person’s residual wage is interacted
with the return to skill within cells deﬁned by sector and education group, not just sector.
29the results presented in the tables. Therefore, we now use our estimates to present the
relationship between levels of skill and the propensity to emigrate under several scenarios.
Speciﬁcally, we compute the predicted values of the regression after substituting diﬀerent
relative returns to skill between Israel and the US, and show how the relationship between
skill and the probability of emigration changes under each scenario.
For example, Figure 7 analyzes the magnitude of selection on education from the
industry analysis, by showing the predicted levels of emigration (according to the estimated
parameters in the last column of Table 5) under various relative diﬀerences in the returns to
education between Israel and the US. To be precise, the line for “relative return = -0.04” is
computed by predicting the probability of emigrating for each person using the coeﬃcients
in Table 5, after we substitute -0.04 into the equation in place of the actual relative return
to education in Israel versus the US. Then, the predicted probabilities are graphed as a
smoothed quadratic function of education in the ﬁgure. Figure 7 computes similar lines
for other magnitudes for the relative return to education (-0.02, 0.0, and 0.02). We chose
these numbers in order to examine the sensitivity of the relationship between education
and emigration using various levels of returns to skill that are similar to the actual levels
— Table 2 showed that the aggregate relative return to education in Israel versus the US is
roughly -0.03 (0.071 for Israel and 0.10 for the US).
The simulations in Figure 7 show that the relationship between education and the
probability of emigrating is very sensitive to the relative return to education. The proba-
bility that a person with a college degree (15 years of schooling) emigrates doubles when
the relative return decreases in Israel from -0.02 to -0.04. In the other direction, when the
relative return moves in the positive direction (i.e. higher returns in Israel), the relation-
ship between education and emigration becomes negative (which is easier to see in Figure
8). In Figure 9, we compare the predicted emigration rates using the actual relative return
to education with the predicted rates after decreasing the actual relative return by 0.02.
Again, this change in the relative return exacerbates the positive selection signiﬁcantly.
In Figure 10, we compare the actual rates with what happens when the relative return to
education in Israel is increased by 0.03 (which roughly makes the average return equal in
Israel and the US). Overall, Figure 10 shows that the entire relationship between education
and emigration can be eliminated if the relative returns to skill were similar to those in the
US. These simulations suggest that the estimated selection parameters are not only sig-
niﬁcant statistically, but are considerably large in magnitude. (We do not do simulations
for the occupation-level analysis of selection on education, since these coeﬃcients were not
30signiﬁcant, and therefore, the magnitudes should be considered close to zero.)
In order to demonstrate the magnitude of selection on unobservable skill, Figure 11
shows the predicted emigration rates from the industry level analysis for various levels of
the relative return to unobserved skill between Israel and the US. For example, the line for
“relative residual SD = -0.05” is computed by predicting the probability of emigrating for
each person using the coeﬃcients in Table 9, after we substitute -0.05 into the equation
in place of the actual diﬀerence in residual variation between Israel and the US. We do
the same for other values of the relative diﬀerence in residual variation, and the predicted
probabilities are graphed as a smoothed quadratic function of the residual wage decile in
the ﬁgure.
Figure 11 demonstrates that the inverse U-shaped pattern between residual wages
and emigration rates shifts to the right as the relative return to skill in Israel versus the US
decreases. Consistent with Proposition 3, the tendency for individuals with higher levels of
unobserved skill to leave the country increases as the return to unobserved ability declines
in Israel. When the relative return declines from 0.05 to -0.05, the emigration rate of those
at the second lowest decile declines from about 1.70 percent to 1.40 percent, while the rate
for those at the second highest decile increases from 1.35 percent to 1.55 percent. This
shift in the propensity to emigrate is consistent with the idea that country-speciﬁc skills
keep the overall pattern of the relationship in the form of an inverse U-shape, while the
increase in the return to general unobservable skills induces a shift rightward in the entire
curve.
Figure 12 compares the actual rates of emigration to those predicted by the model
when the relative level of residual variation is decreased by 0.04. Again, we see the shift
rightward of the entire curve: the emigration rate of those at the second lowest decile
decreases from 1.55 to 1.45 percent, while the rate at the second highest decile increases
from 1.40 to 1.50 percent. These are reasonably large shifts in terms of the magnitudes,
but Figure 13 shows that if we essentially equalize the residual variation between Israel
and the US displayed in Table 2 (by increasing the relative diﬀerence by 0.025), the shift in
the curve is not very large. Therefore, we draw two conclusions from these ﬁgures. First,
the coeﬃcient for the selection on unobservables in the industry-level analysis is quite
signiﬁcant in magnitude. However, the relative diﬀerence in residual variation between the
US and Israel is not very large.
A similar set of ﬁgures is now presented for the selection of unobservable skill using
the occupation level analysis. Figure 14 shows the familiar shift to the right of the U-
31shaped curve when the relative return to unobservable skill decreases in Israel versus the
US, thus increasing positive selection on unobservable skill. However, the magnitudes are
larger than those depicted in Figure 11 for the industry level analysis, which follows from
the larger coeﬃcient for the interaction parameter in Table 10 (-0.055) versus -0.031 in
Table 9. The larger magnitudes are displayed again in Figure 15 which shows a large shift
towards greater positive selection when the relative return in Israel is decreased by 0.04,
and in Figure 16 which shows a signiﬁcant decrease in positive selection when the relative
return in Israel increases by 0.025 (essentially equalizing the residual variation across the
two countries). Overall, these ﬁgures show that the parameters governing the selection
process on unobservable skill are signiﬁcant statistically and also in magnitude.
Furthermore, the simulations in this section conﬁrm the main predictions of the
model: a decrease in the relative return to education in Israel increases the positive rela-
tionship between education and the propensity to emigrate, while the U-shaped relationship
between unobservable skill and emigration shifts to the right when the relative return to
unobserved skill in Israel declines.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Using a unique data set containing information on the labor market outcomes of individ-
uals before they decide to move or not, this paper presents the most extensive analysis of
emigrant selection based on observable and unobservable skills. Building on the theoretical
framework of Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987, 1991, 1999), we develop a model which predicts
that the relationship between education and emigration should be positive if the relative
return to education is lower in the source country versus a potential host country, while the
relationship between moving and unobservable skills should be characterized by an inverse
U-shaped pattern. The ﬁrst prediction is similar to Borjas (1987), since education is con-
sidered a general skill in our analysis. However, unobservable skills are composed of both
general and country-speciﬁcs k i l l s ,a n ds i n c et h o s ea tt h et o po ft h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o na r e
the most likely to have both types of skill in abundance, they are less likely to risk losing
their country-speciﬁc skills by moving than those towards the middle of the unobservable
skill distribution. Thus, the pattern for unobservable skills exhibits an inverse U-shape.
These predictions are supported by the general patterns in our data. Furthermore,
we exploit diﬀerences across sectors in the relative returns to observable and unobservable
skills between Israel and the United States to identify the causal eﬀect of inequality in
32each country on the propensity to emigrate. We ﬁnd strong evidence that a lower return
to unobservable skills in Israel versus the United States entices higher ability Israelis to
leave the country. Also, we ﬁnd that the positive relationship between education and the
probability of moving intensiﬁes in industries with a lower relative return to education
in Israel versus the United States. The estimates suggest that the positive relationship
between education and emigration could be eliminated entirely if the returns to skill were
similar across the two countries.
It is worthwhile to note that these results are unlikely to be due to US immigration
policy. Although US immigration authorities do consider the skill level and sector of work
for each Israeli applying for a visa, the regressions control for sector-speciﬁce ﬀects (industry
and occupation), and it is highly unlikely that US immigration authorities are running
regressions within each sector in the US and Israel, and tailoring their policies to the relative
returns within each sector between the US and a small country like Israel. Overall, the
results strongly support our model and the importance of diﬀerentiating between general
and “country-speciﬁc” skills in the analysis of immigrant selection.
Our ﬁndings have important implications regarding the desired level of inequality in
a country. Although the high level of inequality in the United States is commonly regarded
in a negative light, it does play an important role in making the United States a magnet
for the most talented workers in the world. Therefore, to a large degree, a country’s level
of inequality represents how well it will be able to compete with the US for its smartest
people. So, even if a country has a high level of inequality, like Israel, it should be careful
about reducing it in ways that will lead to a signiﬁcant brain drain.
339 APPENDIX
We now present the proofs to the proposition in the main text.
P R O O FO FP R O P O S I T I O N1 :


















(1+γ)˜ w. If ˜ w ≥ 1, then g˜U[˜ w − 1,1]. For
a−βe+˜ w
1+γ ≥ 1 ←→ ˜ w ≥
1+γ − (a − βe),p (˜ w,e)=0 . For ˜ w ∈ (1,1+γ − (a − βe)), as follows from (4), noting
that since γ<1 and ˜ w ≤ 2,
a−βe+˜ w






(2− ˜ w)(1+γ) .
Parts 2-7 follow from the properties of (5). ¤
P R O O FO FP R O P O S I T I O N2 :
The proposition follows directly from the properties of (5), noting that β>0. ¤
P R O O FO FP R O P O S I T I O N3 :
For any given ˜ w and e, there exists a threshold level of g above which individuals
decide to emigrate. In particular, for ˜ w =1 , it follows that g˜U[0,1], and hence this





s + g =˜ w, it follows that an individual at the threshold level of g, given that ˜ w =1 , will
have speciﬁc skills equal to s =1−ˆ g =
γ−(a−βe)
γ+1 . For this individual, by deﬁnition of being
at the threshold, w0 = w1, and hence βe+ γg = a + s. Suppose there is a rise in γ and a
such that this individual remains indiﬀerent, and hence, p(1,e) is unchanged. In this case,
t h er i s ei na is given by da = gdγ =
1+(a−βe)
γ+1 dγ, where dγ is the change in γ.
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.
Hence, for dγ > 0 and ˜ w<1,d p (˜ w,e) < 0.
34Similarly, for ˜ w ∈ (1,1+γ − (a − βe)),p (˜ w,e)=
1+γ−(a−βe)− ˜ w
(2− ˜ w)(1+γ) , and the change in
p(˜ w,e),d p (˜ w,e), holding p(1,e) constant is,
dp(˜ w,e)=
1+γ + dγ − (a + da − βe) − ˜ w
(2 − ˜ w)(1+γ + dγ)
−
1+γ − (a − βe) − ˜ w
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(˜ w − 2)(γ + dγ +1 )
.
Hence, for dγ > 0 and ˜ w>1,d p (˜ w,e) > 0. ¤
P R O O FO FP R O P O S I T I O N4 :
First note that the density function derived from the distribution of ˜ w, which is the
sum of two independent uniform distributions on the unit interval, is:
f(˜ w)=
½
˜ wf o r ˜ w ≤ 1
2 − ˜ wf o r ˜ w>1
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(γ − a + βe)
2
2γ
the derivatives appearing in the proposition are straightforward noting that γ>a .
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Mover 2004  0.016    0.126 
Mover  2002  0.013    0.114 
Returned 2002-2004 (for Movers 2002)  0.020    0.141 
Left by end of 2000 (for Movers 2004)  0.672    0.470 
Education 13.011    3.187 
Age 37.773    4.613 
Married 0.898    0.303 
Native 0.614    0.487 
Age Arrived in Israel (non-natives only)  20.344    13.274 
Asia-Africa Origin  0.466    0.499 
European Origin  0.480    0.500 
Israeli Origin  0.054    0.227 
Number of Children  2.130    1.366 
Log Wage (monthly)  8.605    0.593 
      
Observations 40713 
      
The core sample used throughout the paper and in this table includes all male respondents between the ages 
of 30 and 45 in the 1995 Israel Census who were not self-employed, worked at least 30 hours a week, and 
worked at least six months in the previous 12 months.  Wages are monthly wages in Israeli Shekels using 
1995 prices.   1
 
Table 2: Descriptive OLS Regressions for Male Workers in Israel and the US 
 


















    
            
Education 0.100***    0.071***  0.002***    -0.002 
 (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.000)    (0.002) 
Age 0.108***    0.080***  -0.003    0.002 
 (0.012)    (0.010)  (0.002)    (0.025) 
Age-squared -0.001***    -0.001***  0.000    -0.000 
 (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000) 
Married 0.223***    0.186***  -0.003    -0.009 
 (0.006)    (0.008)  (0.002)    (0.019) 
Year 1994  -0.008           
 (0.007)           
Year 1996  0.002           
 (0.007)           
Native     -0.099***  0.005***    -0.016 
     (0.008)  (0.002)    (0.026) 
Age Arrived in 
Israel     -0.019***  0.001***    -0.001 
     (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.001) 
Asia-Africa 
Origin     -0.161  -0.000    0.005 
     (0.011)  (0.003)    (0.034) 
European Origin      -0.016  0.001    0.039 
     (0.012)  (0.003)    (0.033) 
Log Wage         -0.001    0.003 
       (0.003)    (0.014) 
Intercept 5.271***    5.921***  0.070    -0.024 
 (0.214)    (0.184)  (0.047)    (0.459) 
            
Root MSE  0.523    0.498       
Observations 33,302    40,713  40,713    538 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  The Israel sample is 
described in Table 1.  The sample for the United States comes from the 1994, 1995, and 1996 March CPS 
files (dummy variables are included in the specifications for each sample year).  The US sample includes 
all white, native, male respondents between the ages of 30 and 45 in the three CPS files who were not self-
employed, worked at least 30 hours a week, and worked at least six months in the previous 12 months.  
Wages are monthly wages and are adjusted to 1995 price levels using the CPI-U index.   2
 




































13493 0.017  8.561  12.723  0.078  0.113  0.451  0.500 
 





































1179 0.015 8.467 12.602 0.061  0.066  0.531  0.567 
Industry categories were matched across the Israeli 1995 Census and the CPS files from the US.  The rate of 
return to education in each sector in Israel comes from a regression specified in the second column of Table 2, 
but run on a sample of workers within each sector.  The “Residual SD” for each sector in Israel comes from the 
same set of regressions and is computed by calculating the standard deviation of residuals within each education 
group (high school dropouts, high school graduates, and college graduates) within each sector, and then 
computing the mean by sector.  Similarly, the returns to education and “Residual SD” for the US comes from 
similar regressions as specified in the first column in Table 1 for each sector.   3
 






























SD in US 
Academic 






























3595 0.014 8.348 11.717 0.063  0.054  0.473  0.532 
Occupation categories were matched across the Israeli 1995 Census and the CPS files from the US.  The 
rate of return to education in each sector in Israel comes from a regression specified in the second column 
of Table 2, but run on a sample of workers within each sector.  The “Residual SD” for each sector in Israel 
comes from the same set of regressions and is computed by calculating the standard deviation of residuals 
within each education group (high school dropouts, high school graduates, and college graduates) within 
each sector, and then computing the mean by sector.  Similarly, the returns to education and “Residual SD” 





Table 5:  Selection on Education – Main Results for the Industry Level Analysis 
 
 
Probit for being a Mover in 2004 
 
        
Education* -0.0146    -0.0930***   
Israel ROR Educ in Industry i  (0.018)    (0.027)   
        
 
Education*    0.0202** 0.0511***   
US ROR Educ in Industry i    (0.0083)  (0.012)   
        
Education*       -0.0427*** 
Diff between Israel and US in          (0.011) 
ROR Educ in Industry i         
        
        
        
Industry Wage Residual   0.000155  0.000144  0.000119  0.000130 
 (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
Industry Wage Residual
2   -0.00481***  -0.00481***  -0.00482***  -0.00482*** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015) 
Education 0.00217*  -0.000903  0.00254*  -0.000170 
 (0.0013)  (0.00085)  (0.0014)  (0.00038) 
Married 0.00132  0.00128  0.00126  0.00126 
 (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014) 
Number of Children  -0.00199***  -0.00199***  -0.00201***  -0.00200*** 
 (0.00045)  (0.00045)  (0.00045)  (0.00045) 
Native 0.00249  0.00244  0.00242  0.00242 
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Age Arrived in Israel  0.000634***  0.00063***  0.000631***  0.000632*** 
 (0.000062)  (0.00006)  (0.000061)  (0.000061) 
        
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 40,713  40,713  40,713  40,713 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  All specifications 
include controls for age, age-squared, and ethnic dummies.. Coefficients are the marginal effects calculated 




Table 6:  Selection on Education – Main Results for the Occupation Level Analysis 
 
 
Probit for being a Mover in 2004 
 
        
Education* -0.0297**    -0.0298**   
Israel ROR Educ in Occup i  (0.012)    (0.012)   
        
 
Education*    -0.0221** -0.0219**   
US ROR Educ in Occup i    (0.010)  (0.0099)   
        
Education*       0.00157 
Diff between Israel and US in          (0.0079) 
ROR Educ in Occupation i         
        
        
        
Occupation Wage Residual   -0.000909  -0.000868  -0.000871  -0.000895 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Occupation Wage Residual
2   -0.00482***  -0.00480***  -0.00484***  -0.00478*** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015) 
Education 0.00240***  0.00269***  0.00400***  0.00113*** 
 (0.00058)  (0.00075)  (0.00093)  (0.00029) 
Married 0.00115  0.00110  0.00117  0.00109 
 (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0015) 
Number of Children  -0.00200***  -0.00197***  -0.00201***  -0.00196*** 
 (0.00045)  (0.00045)  (0.00045)  (0.00045) 
Native 0.00262  0.00255  0.00262  0.00255 
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Age Arrived in Israel  0.000646***  0.000635**
*  0.000644*** 0.000637*** 
 (0.000062)  (0.000062)  (0.000062)  (0.000062) 
        
Occupation Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 40,713  40,713  40,713  40,713 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  All specifications 
include controls for age, age-squared, and ethnic dummies.. Coefficients are the marginal effects calculated 
at the sample means of the explanatory variables.   6
Table 7:  Selection on Education – Sensitivity to Sample Selection 
 
 
Probit for being a Mover in 2004 
 
        
Industry Level Analysis       
        
Education* -0.0427***  -0.0484***  -0.0321  -0.0426*** 
Diff between Israel and US 
in  ROR Educ in Industry i 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.024)  (0.011) 
 
       
Sample Restriction  None  Natives  Non-Natives  Industries 
with Sample 
Size > 1000 
 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Observations 40,713  25,011  15,702  40,050 
       
       
Occupation Level Analysis       
        
        
Education* 0.00157  0.00509  -0.00612  0.00147 
Diff between Israel and US 
in ROR Educ in Occupation i 
(0.0079) (0.0096)  (0.016)  (0.0079) 
 
       
Sample Restriction  None  Natives  Non-Natives  Occupations 
with Sample 
Size > 1000 
 
Occupation Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Observations 40,713  25,011  15,702  40,197 
        
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  All specifications 
include controls for education, age, age-squared, ethnic dummies, marital status, native status, and age 
arrived in Israel (if non-native). The industry analysis also controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his industry and its square, while the occupation analysis controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his occupation and its square. Coefficients are the marginal effects calculated at the sample means of 
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Industry Level Analysis       
        
Education*  -0.0427*** -0.0321*** -0.0315***  -0.0269*** 
Diff between Israel and US in    (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.0090) 
ROR Educ in Industry i       
       
       
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  40,713 40,713 40,713  40,713 
       
       
Occupation Level Analysis       
       
       
Education*  0.00157 0.00136 0.00151  -0.00103 
Diff between Israel and US in    (0.0079) (0.0074) (0.0073)  (0.0064) 
ROR Educ in Occupation i       
       
       
Occupation Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  40,713 40,713 40,713  40,713 
        
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  All specifications 
include controls for education, age, age-squared, ethnic dummies, marital status, native status, and age 
arrived in Israel (if non-native). The industry analysis also controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his industry and its square, while the occupation analysis controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his occupation and its square. Coefficients are the marginal effects calculated at the sample means of 




Table 9:  Selection on Unobservables – Main Industry Level Analysis 
 
 
Probit for being a Mover in 2004 
 
        
Industry Wage Residual*  -0.0212    -0.0295*   
Israel Residual SD   (0.015)    (0.016)   
in Industry-Education Group  i         
        
 
Industry Wage Residual*    0.0219 0.0357   
US Residual SD     (0.021)  (0.022)   
in Industry-Education Group i         
        
 
Industry Wage Residual *        -0.0311** 
Difference between Israel and         (0.015) 
US in Residual SD           
in Industry-Education Group i         
        
        
Industry Wage Residual   0.0106  -0.0113  -0.00328  -0.000146 
 (0.0077)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.0010) 
Industry Wage Residual
2   -0.00524***  -0.00494***  -0.00549***  -0.00550*** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015) 
Education 0.000862***  0.00085***  0.000864***  0.000865*** 
 (0.00025)  (0.0003)  (0.00025)  (0.00025) 
Married 0.00114  0.00113  0.00112  0.00113 
 (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014) 
Number of Children  -0.00191***  -0.00191***  -0.00190***  -0.00190*** 
 (0.00045)  (0.00045)  (0.00045)  (0.00045) 
Native 0.00218  0.00215  0.00213  0.00214 
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Age Arrived in Israel  0.000609***  0.00061***  0.000606***  0.000606*** 
 (0.000062)  (0.00006)  (0.000062)  (0.000062) 
        
Industry-Education Group  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects         
        
Observations 40,412  40,412  40,412  40,412 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  All specifications 
include controls for age, age-squared, and ethnic dummies.. Coefficients are the marginal effects calculated 
at the sample means of the explanatory variables.   9
 
 
 Table 10:  Selection on Unobservables – Main Occupation Level Analysis 
 
 
Probit for being a Mover in 2004 
 
        
Occupation Wage Residual*  -0.0764***    -0.0785***   
Israel Residual SD   (0.028)    (0.028)   
in Occup-Education Group  i         
        
 
Occupation Wage Residual*    0.0245 0.0303   
US Residual SD     (0.029)  (0.029)   
in Occup-Education Group i         
        
 
Occupation Wage Residual *      -0.0552*** 
Difference between Israel and         (0.021) 
US in Residual SD           
in Occup-Education Group i         
        
        
Occupation Wage Residual   0.0357***  -0.0135  0.0213  -0.00257** 
 (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.0012) 
Occupation Wage Residual
2   -0.00569***  -0.00493***  -0.00584***  -0.00569*** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015) 
Education 0.000897***  0.00088***  0.000896***  0.000892*** 
 (0.00024)  (0.0003)  (0.00024)  (0.00024) 
Married 0.000969  0.000999  0.000956  0.000958 
 (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014) 
Number of Children  -0.00187***  -0.00190***  -0.00186***  -0.00187*** 
 (0.00044)  (0.00044)  (0.00044)  (0.00044) 
Native 0.00224  0.00225  0.00222  0.00221 
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Age Arrived in Israel  0.000596***  0.00060***  0.000596***  0.000596*** 
 (0.000063)  (0.00006)  (0.000063)  (0.000063) 
        
Occupation-Education Group  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects         
        
Observations 40,621  40,621  40,621  40,621 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  All specifications 
include controls for age, age-squared, and ethnic dummies.. Coefficients are the marginal effects calculated 
at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 11:  Selection on Unobservables – Sensitivity to Sample Selection 
 
 
Probit for being a Mover in 2004 
 
        
Industry Level Analysis       
        
 
Industry Wage Residual *  -0.0311**  -0.0244*  -0.0340  -0.0331** 
Difference between Israel   (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.033)  (0.015) 
and US in Residual SD  in         
Industry-Education Group i         
        
        
Sample Restriction  None  Natives  Non-Natives  Industries 
with Sample 
Size > 1000 
 
Industry-Education Group  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects         
        
Observations 40,412  24,674  15,602  39,749 
       
       
Occupation Level Analysis       
        
 
Occupation Wage Residual *  -0.0552***  -0.0515**  -0.0636  -0.0621*** 
Difference between Israel   (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.044)  (0.021) 
and US in Residual SD in         
Occup-Education Group i         
 
       
Sample Restriction  None  Natives  Non-Natives  Occupations 
with Sample 
Size > 1000 
 
Occupation-Education Group  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects         
        
Observations 40,621  24,573  15,673  40,105 
        
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  All specifications 
include controls for education, age, age-squared, ethnic dummies, marital status, native status, and age 
arrived in Israel (if non-native). The industry analysis also controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his industry and its square, while the occupation analysis controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his occupation and its square. Coefficients are the marginal effects calculated at the sample means of 
the explanatory variables. 
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Industry Level Analysis       
        
 
Industry Wage Residual *  -0.0311**  -0.0223  -0.0236*  -0.0226* 
Difference between Israel   (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
and US in Residual SD  in         
Industry-Education Group i         
        
        
 
Industry-Education Group  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects         
        
Observations 40,412  40,412  40,412  40,412 
       
       
Occupation Level Analysis       
        
 
Occupation Wage Residual *  -0.0552***  -0.0449**  -0.0442**  -0.0406** 
Difference between Israel   (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
and US in Residual SD in         
Occup-Education Group i         
 
       
 
Occupation-Education Group  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects         
        
Observations 40,621  40,621  40,621  40,621 
        
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  All specifications 
include controls for education, age, age-squared, ethnic dummies, marital status, native status, and age 
arrived in Israel (if non-native). The industry analysis also controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his industry and its square, while the occupation analysis controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his occupation and its square. Coefficients are the marginal effects calculated at the sample means of 
the explanatory variables.   12
Table 13:  Various Robustness Checks for Mover 2004 Status 
 
 
Industry Level Analysis 
        
Education* -0.0427***  -0.0610***    -0.0422*** 
Diff between Israel and US in    (0.011)  (0.015)    (0.011) 
ROR Educ in Industry i        
        
 
Industry Wage Residual  
(or Residual Rank) *  -0.0311**  -0.0348*  -0.0291*  -0.00422* 
Difference between Israel   (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.0025) 
and US in Residual SD          
        
 
Industry Wage Residual Squared*     0.00814   
Difference between Israel      (0.018)   
and US in Residual SD          
        
        
 Occupation  Level  Analysis 
        
Education* 0.00157  -0.00429    0.00209 
Diff between Israel and US in    (0.0079)  (0.010)    (0.0079) 
ROR Educ in Occupation i        
        
 
Occupation Wage Residual  
(or Residual Rank) *  -0.0552***  -0.0677***  -0.0528**  -0.00727** 
Difference between Israel   (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.021)  (0.0032) 
and US in Residual SD          
        
 
Occup Wage Residual Squared*     0.0298   
Difference between Israel      (0.029)   
and US in Residual SD          
        
 
Using Residual Ranks within 
each 5-year Age Group 
 
No   No  No  Yes 
Probit or OLS  Probit  OLS  Probit  Probit 
        
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  Within each panel, 
each column represents a separate regression.  The first column represents the “benchmark” specifications 
described in earlier tables.  Changes to the benchmark specifications are described according to the 
information provided in the table. Residual ranks were computed within the individual’s age group, where 
the age groups are 30-34, 35-39, and 40-45. Coefficients represent the marginal effects (calculated at the 
sample means of the explanatory variables if it comes from a probit).     13
 
Table 14:  Estimating Selection on Education and Unobservables Together 
 
 







          
Education* -0.0418***  -0.0306*       
Diff between Israel and US in    (0.011)  (0.017)       
ROR Educ in Industry i           
 
Industry Wage Residual *  -0.0308**  -0.0303**      
Difference between Israel   (0.015)  (0.015)       
and US in Residual SD  in           
Industry-Education Group i           
          
Education*       0.00184  -0.0123 
Diff between Israel and US in          (0.0078)  (0.011) 
ROR Educ in Occupation i           
 
Occupation Wage Residual *       -0.0568*** -0.0546*** 
Difference between Israel         (0.021)  (0.021) 
and US in Residual SD in           
Occup-Education Group i           
          
 










Yes      
Fixed Effects           
          
Occupation Fixed Effects        Yes  No 
 




Fixed Effects           
          
Observations 40,713  40,412    40,713  40,621 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  All specifications 
include controls for education, age, age-squared, ethnic dummies, marital status, native status, and age 
arrived in Israel (if non-native). The industry analysis also controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his industry and its square, while the occupation analysis controls for the individual’s residual wage 
within his occupation and its square. Coefficients are the marginal effects calculated at the sample means of 

















































HS Dropouts HS Graduates BA Degree MA Degree or More
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13 to 17 Year Old Israelis













































HS Dropouts HS Graduates BA Degree MA Degree or More
All Israelis Who Were Movers in 2002
















































Lowest 10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80-90% Highest 10%
Controlling for Education, Age, Ethnicity, and Native Status
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Controlling for Occupation, Education, Age, Ethnicity, and Native Status




































5 10 15 20 25
Years of Schooling
Relative Return = -0.04 Relative Return = -0.02
Relative Return = 0.00 Relative Return = 0.02
Under Various Returns to Schooling in all Industries in Israel versus US





































5 10 15 20 25
Years of Schooling
Relative Return = -0.02 Relative Return =  0.00
Relative Return = 0.02 Relative Return = 0.04
Under Various Returns to Schooling in all Industries in Israel versus US



































5 10 15 20 25
Years of Schooling
Actual Relative Return in Israel Decreased by 0.02
Actual versus Decrease in Relative Return to School in All Industries by 0.02






































5 10 15 20 25
Years of Schooling
Actual Relative Return in Israel Increased by 0.03
Actual versus Increase in Relative Return to School in All Industries by 0.03















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Industry Residual Wage Decile
Relative Residual SD = -0.05 Relative Residual SD = 0.00
Relative Residual SD = 0.05
Under Various Levels of Relative Industry Inequality in Israel versus US
















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Industry Residual Wage Decile
Actual Decrease Relative Residual SD by 0.04
Actual versus Decreasing Relative Inequality in all Industries in Israel by 0.04















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Industry Residual Wage Decile
Actual Increase Relative Residual SD by 0.025
Actual versus Increase in Relative Inequality in all Industries in Israel by 0.025




































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Occupation Residual Wage Decile
Relative Residual SD = -0.05 Relative Residual SD = 0.00
Relative Residual SD = 0.05
Under Various Levels of Relative Occupation Inequality in Israel versus US















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Occupation Residual Wage Decile
Actual Decrease Relative Residual SD by 0.04
Actual versus Decreasing Relative Inequality in all Occupations in Israel by 0.04

















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Occupation Residual Wage Decile
Actual Increase Relative Residual SD by 0.025
Actual versus Increase in Relative Inequality in all Occupations in Israel by 0.025




The following simulations were conducted by assuming that the unobservable general 
and country-specific skills, g and s, are normally distributed with different specifications 
for the correlation between them.  For both g and s, we assume a mean of 1 and a 
standard deviation of 1.  Values of g and s are truncated to be positive, since negative 
values of s would create an incentive in our model to leave Israel just to get rid of their 
country-specific skills.  The simulations are conducted with a=0.1 (the total fixed cost of 
moving) and γ=0.1 (the difference in the return to g between the host and the home 
country), and we abstract from schooling by assuming that years of education equal zero. 
The first figure shows that an inverse U-shaped pattern between the probability of 
emigrating and residual wages is also obtained after simulating the model with a normal 
distribution for both of the unobservable skills (instead of the uniform distribution used in 
the main text).  The second and third figures show a similar pattern even if we allow for a 












































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Simulated Residual Wage Decile
G and S are Normal with a Correlation = 0










































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Simulated Residual Wage Decile
G and S are Normal with a Correlation = 0.3




































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Simulated Residual Wage Decile
G and S are Normal with a Correlation = -0.3
Appendix Figure 3: Simulation using the Normal Distribution
 
 